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Abstract 
We show that voters are fiscal conservatives, although in the long run only: while 
the average (over the mandate) level of debt has a negative impact on the 
probability of reelection, pre-election debt accumulation by incumbents increases 
their probability of reelection. As the negative impact is larger the higher the debt 
level, it compensates the short run effect. Elections thus appear as a disciplining 
device, even if a weak one. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Spending on infrastructures is generally considered as good, even though it generally 
comes with strings, in the form of interest charges. The expression "visible expenditures" 
has been coined by Kneebone and McKenzie (2001), to catch the positive impact of some 
types of spending on politicians' electoral prospects. However, even visible expenditures 
have costs, which may be hidden to retrospective voters, but which will appear in the 
long run, in the form of higher taxes. This is even truer if politicians, to boost their 
probability of reelection, spend lavishly on expenditures that are visible, but not 
necessarily useful, or which do not trigger further growth and, as a consequence, do not 
expand the future tax base. The internalization of this effect by politicians should induce 
a bias towards debt accumulation, even under a golden fiscal rule. 
 
In this paper, we test the impact of the accumulation of debt over an electoral cycle on an 
incumbent's probability of reelection, separating the impact of the debt accumulated in 
the first years of the mandate from the last years. Our results show that voters are fiscally 
conservative, punishing incumbents for the accumulation of debt, although the effect is 
offset when incumbents increase debt right before the election. However, and 
interestingly, the higher the debt level, the more voters punish the incumbent, acting as 
debt brakes, and counteracting the politicians' incentives to accumulate debt. Our results 
are thus as much an indirect confirmation of the "visible expenditures" effect as of the 
disciplining effect of elections. 
 
 
2. Context and related literature 
 
The electoral law designing local elections in France is fixed since 1983. Local elections 
are usually held every six years, and a threshold of 3,500 inhabitants defines the voting 
system that applies. Our sample contains all cities with populations above this threshold, 
in which polling is organized according to published lists. Two rounds are run if no 
candidate passes the 50% level. The winning list receives half the seats on the town 
council; the remaining seats are distributed proportionally across all the lists (including 
the winning one) that received more than 5% of the votes. If a second round is necessary, 
all lists with more than 10% of the votes can compete and the winner is the one that 
attracts the larger number of votes. Under such an electoral law, it is not surprising that 
the French political landscape is characterized by the existence of several important 
political parties, and not by a bipartisan scene, and this even truer at the local level. 
Voters can often choose among candidates from more than ten political parties. The 
number of candidates will thus be considered in what follows, as it will impact the 
incumbent's ex ante chance of being reelected (Cassette et al., 2012). 
 
The literature has revealed that targeted spending can influence voters’ decisions, in 
particular at the local level. Brender (2003) shows that capital expenditures favor 
outgoing mayors in Israel, while Drazen and Eslava (2010) show that investment 
spending increases before an election, and has a positive impact on the incumbent’s 
reelection prospects in Colombia. Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) show that capital 
expenditures and investment are more apparent to the voter than operating expenses and 
that they influence the prospects of reelection. Veiga and Veiga (2007) confirm this result 
for municipalities in Portugal and Aidt et al. (2011) show that opportunistic behavior 
prevails in Portugal, and even more so when the win-margin is small. Similarly, Sakurai 
and Menezes-Filho (2008) analyze the influence of public expenditure on the probability 
of mayors being reelected in Brazil, showing that mayors who spend more during their 
terms of office increase the probability of their own reelection or that of a successor from 
the same political party. Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) find that, in Russia, pre-
electoral manipulation of fiscal policy instruments increases the incumbent’s reelection 
chances. 
 
The literature on French local elections notably includes Jérôme-Speziari and Jérôme 
(2002), Fauvelle-Aymar and François (2006) or Dubois and Paty (2010) but none of these 
have looked at the impact of debt and pre-electoral debt manipulation on the incumbent's 
electoral success, and they generally have a more restricted geographical sample than the 
one we use here. Cassette et al. (2012) use a similar sample but analyze the political 
dynamics between the two-rounds of the electoral process, but they do not focus on the 
debt dynamics and their influence on electoral outcomes. 
 
 
3. Results 
 
Our dependent variable is the probability of reelection of the incumbent mayor’s party‡ at 
the 2008 municipal election. This focuses on partisan effects because we want to explain 
the party result, controlling for the mayor's idiosyncratic political capital (as mayors in 
France can also be minister, or deputy, or senator in parallel, we control for this 
cumulating of official positions). Due to data availability of our main variable of interest, 
i.e. municipal debt, we have to restrict our sample to the 2008 election. Table 1 contains 
the statistics that describe our sample. 
 
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
 
We provide several variables to account for debt level and evolution over the mandate. 
All of them are expressed in terms of the fiscal potential of the municipality (a measure 
of taxable wealth). First, consistently with the literature on economic voting, we 
introduce one year lagged debt, which also allows remaining coherent with the timing of 
the elections, which took place in March. At that time, voters know the expected budget 
of the preceding year, but also the effective value of spending, revenues, and debt. 
Second, to check for different effects according to the level of debt, we put dummy 
variables to identify municipalities where debt is higher than 2 and those where debt falls 
between 1 and 2. Third, we split the debt variable according to its level, separating it 
along the value of the ratio debt / fiscal potential (inferior to 1, between 1 and 2, superior 
to 2). Finally, we consider debt over the whole mandate and adopt the average debt over 
the period 2001-2006 and the deviation before election (2006-2007).  
 
                                                
‡ If the incumbent mayor does not stand for reelection, we treat the candidate representing the same party as 
the incumbent. 
 Our results show that the level of debt negatively impacts the probability of reelection, 
tending to imply that voters are fiscally conservative. However, as revealed by regression 
(2), this is true for the debt accumulated over the beginning of the mandate, but not for 
the accumulation in the last two years before the election. Hence, if voters are 
conservative, they can be wooed in the short term by new spending.  
 
This short term effect is however weaker when debt is high, as shown by estimates in (3) 
and (4): The higher the debt, the lower the probability of reelection, with a marginal 
impact that can be quite large, reaching almost 10% on average in our estimates. It thus 
appears that elections can act as a debt brake, disciplining politicians who could have all 
the incentives to accumulate debt to finance "visible expenditures". 
 
The results relative to our control variables are conform to expectations. If the mayor is 
also a minister (or a deputy, or a senator), this boosts its reelection prospects, as well as if 
she has been elected at the first round of the election at the preceding election. If she 
belongs to the leading coalition in Parliament, the probability is reduced (but this is due 
to a strong mid-term effect of these elections in the French context). The number of 
consecutive mandates has a non-linear impact, first increasing the probability of 
reelection, until an electoral fatigue effect takes place, (slightly) reducing the incumbency 
premium. 
 
Columns (5) to (12) show the results for regressions run on sub-samples separated 
according to whether the candidate is the same person (estimates (9) to (12)) or a 
newcomer presented by the same party  (estimates (5) to (8)). The results are qualitatively 
identical, as well as other robustness checks (not shown for space reasons) on the 
probability of being reelected in the first round of the election. 
 
--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Based on a large sample of French cities, our results show that voters punish incumbents 
for the accumulation of debt, and that the effect is larger the higher the level of debt. 
However, short-term effects (i.e. increases in debt right before the election) act in the 
other direction. We interpret the whole set of results as revealing that elections are debt 
brakes, even if a blunt ones. 
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 Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
!! Mean% Std%Dev.% Min% Max%
DEBT!(t(1)! 1,43% 1,02% 0% 12,01%
DEBT!mandate!average! 1,54% 1% 0% 12,48%
DEBT!change!before!election! *0,0015% 0,27% *2,64% 5,01%
Dummy:!DEBT!>!1!and!<!2! 0,41% 0,49% 0% 1%
Dummy:!DEBT!>!2! 0,22% 0,41% 0% 1%
DEBT!when!DEBT<1! 0.21% 0.31% 0% 0.99%
DEBT!when!DEBT!>1!and!<2! 0.59% 0.73% 0% 1.99%
DEBT!when!DEBT!>2! 0.63% 1.28% 0% 12.01%
Number!of!consecutive!mandates! 1,51% 1,23% 0% 7%
Elected!in!the!first!round!of!the!preceding!election! 0,68% 0,47% 0% 1%
Number!of!candidates! 2,9% 1,29% 1% 11%
Dummy:!Same!party!as!leading!coalition!in!Parliament! 0,53% 0,49% 0% 1%
Mayor!is!Minister! 0,003% 0,05% 0% 1%
Mayor!is!Deputy! 0,08% 0,27% 0% 1%
Mayor!is!Senator! 0,02% 0,14% 0% 1%
Share!of!votes!at!the!Presidential!election! 54,17% 8,32% 30,23% 86,8%
  Source: French Ministry of Interior – DGCL. 
 
 Table 2. Estimates – Probit analysis - Incumbent party's probability of reelection 
 
 
* denotes significance at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.Marginal effects computed at means. Robust errors into parentheses. Froot (1989) correction for intermunicipal-
level cluster correlation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
VARIABLES
-0.021** -0.100*** -0.011
(0.008) (0.034) (0.008)
-0.021** -0.086*** -0.011
(0.009) (0.032) (0.008)
0.077** -0.071 0.089**
(0.033) (0.110) (0.035)
-0.044** -0.108* -0.031
(0.019) (0.063) (0.019)
Dummy DEBT >2 -0.061** -0.240*** -0.029
(0.025) (0.077) (0.024)
DEBT when DEBT<1 -0.068 -0.035 -0.081*
(0.045) (0.147) (0.044)
DEBT when DEBT >1 -0.050** -0.080 -0.048**
(0.020) (0.068) (0.019)
DEBT when DEBT >2 -0.027*** -0.090** -0.020**
(0.010) (0.040) (0.010)
MINISTER 0.148** 0.150** 0.149** 0.153** 0.104 0.107 0.105 0.114
(0.071) (0.069) (0.070) (0.064) (0.092) (0.089) (0.091) (0.082)
DEPUTY 0.160*** 0.159*** 0.162*** 0.161*** 0.243** 0.250** 0.241** 0.242** 0.145*** 0.143*** 0.146*** 0.145***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.107) (0.105) (0.104) (0.106) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
SENATOR 0.106** 0.103** 0.110*** 0.105** 0.088** 0.084** 0.091** 0.086**
(0.042) (0.044) (0.041) (0.043) (0.040) (0.041) (0.039) (0.040)
-0.139*** -0.142*** -0.139*** -0.140*** -0.289*** -0.297*** -0.290*** -0.289*** -0.111*** -0.113*** -0.110*** -0.111***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
-0.052*** -0.051*** -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.061** -0.063** -0.061** -0.061** -0.048*** -0.046*** -0.048*** -0.048***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
0.172*** 0.173*** 0.170*** 0.171*** 0.462*** 0.461*** 0.465*** 0.463*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.122*** 0.122***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.088) (0.088) (0.089) (0.089) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
0.119*** 0.116*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.006 -0.003 0.008 0.005
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
-0.018*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
0.070*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.106* 0.115* 0.110* 0.107* 0.080*** 0.081*** 0.080*** 0.079***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Observations 2,333 2,329 2,334 2,333 364 363 364 364 1,964 1,961 1,965 1,964
Number of consecutive 
mandates
(Number of consecutive 
mandates)²
Elected in the first round 
of the preceding election
DEBT (t-1)
DEBT_ Term mean           
(2001-2006)
Change in debt before 
election
Dummy DEBT>1                       
and <2
From the leading 
coalition in Parliament
Number of candidates
Share of votes at the 
presidential election
DURATION=0 DURATION>=1
